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  NOTE  
Two Tests of Severance:  
Procedural and Substantive Constitutional  
Violations and the Legislative Process in 
Missouri 
Missouri Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State of Missouri, 396 S.W.3d 348 (Mo. 
2013) (en banc). 
JONATHAN WHITFIELD* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legislation is an inexact process.  John Godfrey Saxe noted that “[l]aws 
. . . like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we know how they 
are made.”1  In Missouri, laws are created in the General Assembly.2  First, a 
bill is introduced in either the House or the Senate.3  Second, once a bill pass-
es through the required legislative procedures, it is presented to the Governor, 
who will sign the bill into law, veto the bill and send it back to the General 
Assembly for a potential override vote, not sign the bill, or veto line-items in 
an appropriations bill.4  In two of the four options, the bill becomes a law and 
is made a part of the Revised Statutes of Missouri.5 
But some bills may become laws even when the constitutional rules 
governing the legislative process were not followed.  Such bills are usually 
challenged on the grounds that they are unconstitutional, but not because of 
their content; rather, they are challenged because they violate constitutional 
mandates like the single-subject rule, the clear title rule, or other procedural 
rules.6  In Missouri, constitutional challenges are heard by the Supreme Court 
 
* B.S., Truman State University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2015; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2013-14.  I am grateful to 
Missouri Solicitor General James Layton for his advice and guidance. 
 1. An Impeachment Trial, MICH. U. CHRON., Mar. 27, 1869, at 4, available at 
books.google.com/books?id=cEHiAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA164#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
 2. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 21. 
 3. Appropriations bills are traditionally introduced in the House.  See The Leg-
islative Process in Missouri, MO. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.mo
.gov/content.aspx?info=/info/howbill.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2014). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Appropriations bills, once enacted and passed, are not placed in the Missouri 
Revised Statutes.  MO. REV. STAT. § 3.040 (2012). 
 6. See generally Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legis-
lative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and 
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of Missouri.7  When faced with a procedural rule violation, a court has the 
option of severing the unconstitutional portions of the bill, letting the consti-
tutional portions of the bill remain law.8 
Missouri Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State of Missouri (“Missouri 
Roundtable”) concerned a challenge to the Missouri Science and Innovation 
Reinvestment Act (“MOSIRA”)9 based on a procedural constitutional viola-
tion of the single-subject rule,10 which is a type of constitutional limitation 
placed on the subject matters to be addressed by a bill.11  On August 22, 
2011, pursuant to Article IV, Section 9 of the Missouri Constitution, Gover-
nor Jeremiah Nixon called a special session of the Missouri General Assem-
bly to address MOSIRA.12  According to the Governor’s proclamation, 
MOSIRA would have authorized the Missouri Technology Corporation to 
provide funding to science- and innovation-related businesses.13  The Mis-
souri Technology Corporation “is a public-private partnership created by the 
Missouri General Assembly to promote entrepreneurship and foster the 
growth of new and emerging high-tech companies.”14  The Missouri Senate 
codified MOSIRA in Senate Bill No. 7 (“S.B. 7”), titled “AN ACT to repeal 
sections [certain sections of RSMo], and To enact in lieu thereof fourteen 
new sections relating to science and innovation, with a contingent effective 
date.”15  In addition to MOSIRA, the General Assembly enacted legislation 
dealing with tax credit reform, streamlining state training programs, develop-
ing an international air cargo hub, building high-tech data centers, and attract-
ing amateur sporting events.16  These provisions were enacted in Senate Bill 
No. 8 (“S.B. 8”).17 
 
Clear Title Challenges, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103 (2001) (explaining procedural 
constitutional violations using Missouri case law). 
 7. See MO. CONST. art. V, § 3 (“The supreme court shall have exclusive appel-
late jurisdiction in all cases involving . . . a statute or provision of the constitution of 
this state . . . .”). 
 8. See MO. REV. STAT § 1.140 (2012). 
 9. S.B. 7, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Mo. 2011) [hereinafter S.B. 7], 
available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/pdf-bill/S1/tat/SB7.pdf. 
 10. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 11. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 23. 
 12. See S. JOURNAL, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess., at 1-3 (Mo. 2011) 
[hereinafter FIRST DAY JOURNAL], available at www.senate.mo.gov/11info/Journals/
SDay0109061-14.pdf. 
 13. This funding would have been through “grants, loans and investments” re-
sulting from increases in income taxes generated by employees of new or existing 
science- and innovation-related businesses.  See id. at 2. 
 14. About Missouri Technology Corporation, MO. TECH. CORP., http://www.mis-
souritechnology.com/about-us (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 15. See S.B. 7, supra note 9, at 1. 
 16. See FIRST DAY JOURNAL, supra note 12, at 2. 
 17. See SB 8: Modifies Provisions of Missouri Tax Credit Programs in Accord-
ance With Recommendations Made by the Missouri Tax Credit Review Commission 
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S.B. 7 was the only bill passed during the special session,18 and it con-
tained two sections.19  Section A addressed the substantive provisions of 
MOSIRA,20 and Section B contained a contingency clause that conditioned 
the effectiveness of S.B. 7 on the Governor signing S.B. 8 into law.21  On 
October 21, 2011, Governor Nixon signed S.B. 7 into law.22  But, unlike S.B. 
7, S.B. 8 was not signed into law.23  The contingency clause in S.B. 7 and the 
failed passage of S.B. 8 provided the necessary legal grounds for interest 
groups to challenge the bill.24 
This Note argues that severance is justified in two situations.  First, sev-
erance is justified where authorized by the legislature.  Alternatively, sever-
ance is justified when innocent third parties rely on the passage and imple-
mentation of a law in good faith, and invalidation of the law would have col-
lateral effects that outweigh the need to ensure consistent legislative practice.  
Part II of this Note analyzes the facts and holding of Missouri Roundtable.  
Part III explores the development of severance as a remedy for procedural 
constitutional violations, particularly in the context of the single-subject rule.  
Part IV examines the court’s rationale in Missouri Roundtable and analyzes 
the concurrence by Judge Zel Fischer.  Lastly, Part V argues how single-
subject violations invalidate the entirety of a bill, except in situations where 
other interests outweigh the complete invalidation of a law on an equitable, 
case-by-case basis. 
Because severance is justified in some circumstances, this Note con-
cludes that severance may be carefully applied to procedurally unconstitu-
tional legislation and, in so doing, can restore respect for laws in proportion 
to our knowledge of “how they are made.”25 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In Missouri Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State of Missouri, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri addressed whether the legislature may condition the effec-
tiveness of a section of a law on the future passage of another law.26  Mis-
 
Report, MO. SENATE (Oct. 25, 2011), www.senate.mo.gov/11info/BTS_Web/Bill
.aspx?SessionType=S1&BillID=4696928 [hereinafter S.B. 8]. 
 18. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 350 n.1 (Mo. 2013) 
(en banc). 
 19. See S.B. 7, supra note 9, at 1, 26. 
 20. Id. at 1-25. 
 21. Id. at 26. 
 22. See SB 7: Establishes the Missouri Science and Innovation Reinvestment Act, 
MO. SENATE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?
SessionType=S1&BillID=4696927. 
 23. See S.B. 8, supra note 17. 
 24. See Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Mo. 2013) 
(en banc). 
 25. An Impeachment Trial, supra note 1. 
 26. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 351. 
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souri Roundtable for Life,27  Missouri Right to Life,28 and Lawyers for Life, 
Inc.29 (collectively, “Roundtable”) are all pro-life interest organizations that 
include Missouri taxpayers as their officers and members.30  In 2012, 
Roundtable filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cole County, seeking to enjoin 
S.B. 7 from taking effect and to reverse any actions already taken to execute 
its provisions.31  In a press release, Missouri Round Table for Life stated that 
the organizations sought to enjoin S.B. 7 because of their belief that the Gen-
eral Assembly “refused to attach protective language to MOSIRA that 
[would prevent] Missouri taxpayer dollars from going to abortion, human 
cloning, and embryo experimentation.”32  Roundtable also filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings based on two grounds: first, “Section B of S.B. 7 
was a constitutional example of contingent legislation and that, by the plain 
terms of Section B, Section A was null and unenforceable”;33 and second, “if 
the Circuit Court were to find Section B unconstitutional, Section B could not 
be severed from S.B. 7 because the record demonstrated that the General 
Assembly would not have passed S.B. 7 without the inclusion of Section 
B.”34 
The Circuit Court of Cole County granted Roundtable’s motion based 
on the second argument, ruling that S.B. 7 violated the single-subject rule as 
codified in Article III, Section 23 of the Missouri Constitution.35  The court 
specifically noted it was “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt” that the 
 
 27. Missouri Roundtable for Life is a nonprofit corporation “whose purposes 
include education and advocacy on behalf of human life, especially where misunder-
standing or the lack of adequate legal protection threatens human life.”  About, MO. 
ROUNDTABLE FOR LIFE, http://www.missouriroundtable.org/about/ (last visited July 
30, 2014). 
 28. Missouri Right to Life is a “state-wide organization which upholds and pro-
motes the sanctity of all innocent human life . . . by providing education, by support-
ing legislation and programs that endorse that ideal, and by organizing citizens for 
effective results.”  Mission & Vision Statement, MO. RIGHT TO LIFE, http://mis-
sourilife.org/information/mission.html (last visited July 30, 2014). 
 29. Lawyers for Life, Inc., is a “Missouri non-profit corporation . . . formed in 
1974 for the purpose of education, research, and dissemination of information, rela-
tive to a human being’s right to life, from conception to death, and particularly to 
those matters relating to lawyers and the legal profession.”  Home, LAWYERS FOR 
LIFE, http://www.lawyersforlifeinc.org/ (last visited July 30, 2014). 
 30. Brief of Respondents at 4, Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 
S.W.3d 348 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (No. SC92455), 2012 WL 4425890, at *4. 
 31. See Missouri Roundtable For Life, Missouri Right to Life, and Missouri 
Citizens File Petition with Court; Seek Declaration That MOSIRA Bill Is Void, MO. 
ROUNDTABLE FOR LIFE, http://www.missouriroundtable.org/missouri-roundtable-for-
life-missouri-right-to-life-and-missouri-citizens-file-petition-with-court-seek-
declaration-that-mosira-bill-is-void/ (last visited July 30, 2014). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Brief of Respondents, supra note 30. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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General Assembly would not have passed S.B. 7 without Section B.36  The 
court further held that Section B could not be severed from S.B. 7.37  Conse-
quently, the court found S.B. 7 unconstitutional in its entirety.38  The court 
enjoined any further implementation of S.B. 7 and ordered that actions al-
ready taken be reversed.39 
The Missouri Attorney General’s Office appealed the circuit court’s 
judgment to the Supreme Court of Missouri.40  The State of Missouri argued 
that S.B. 7 was unconstitutional insofar as it abridged the governor’s constitu-
tional authority to sign a bill into law and added a second subject to the bill.41  
The State also argued that Section B of S.B. 7 could be severed from the bill 
while Section A could stand.42  Though Roundtable opposed the State, they 
also argued that S.B. 7 was unconstitutional.43  However, Roundtable differed 
from the State’s position by maintaining that Section B could not be severed 
from S.B. 7 and that the court should strike down the bill in its entirety.44 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri agreed with the circuit court, 
holding that S.B. 7 was an unconstitutional violation of the single-subject 
rule.45  The court reasoned that when a contingency clause conditions the 
passage of one bill upon the passage of another, and is included in the title of 
the initial bill, the initial bill violates the single-subject rule.46   Accordingly, 
the court held that the contingency clause could not be severed from the ini-
tial bill due to its inclusion in the title of the bill.47 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Three concepts form the doctrinal structure of Missouri Roundtable.  
The first is the concept of, and the different types of, unconstitutionally creat-
 
 36. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 37. Id. at 350. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id.; see also Jo Mannies, Judge Rules MOSIRA Law Unconstitutional, 
ST. LOUIS BEACON (Feb. 22, 2012), https://www.stlbeacon.org/#!/content/22734/
mosira_022112. 
 40. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 349. 
 41. Brief of Appellants at 7-16, Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 
S.W.3d 348 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (No. SC92455), available at http://www.courts.mo
.gov/SUP/index.nsf/fe8feff4659e0b7b8625699f0079eddf/c4763db796a45e3186257a3
a006ac9ee/$FILE/SC92455_State_brief.pdf. 
 42. Id. at 16-23. 
 43. See id. at 6. 
 44. Brief of Respondents, supra note 30. 
 45. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 350. 
 46. Id. at 352-53. 
 47. See id. at 350. 
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ed laws.48  The second is the single-subject rule.49  As noted above, the sin-
gle-subject rule is a type of constitutional limitation placed on the subject 
matters to be addressed by a bill.50  The last is severability, which refers to 
the capability that courts have to strike unconstitutional parts of a law and let 
the remainder stand.51 
A.  Types of Unconstitutional Laws 
There are two types of unconstitutional legislation – legislation that vio-
lates procedural constitutional requirements and legislation that violates sub-
stantive constitutional requirements.  Controls on the procedure of the legisla-
tive process are featured in most state constitutions.52  These types of re-
strictions “regulate only the process by which legislation is enacted.”53 Ex-
amples of procedural regulations on legislation include limitations on the 
purpose, subject, or title of the bill.54  Each of these restrictions is “designed 
to eradicate perceived abuses in the legislative process, such as hasty, corrupt, 
or private interest legislation.”55  Abuses of these restrictions are called pro-
cedural constitutional violations.56  Substantive constitutional violations, on 
the other hand, occur when a bill contains provisions that are found to “be 
substantively invalid based on the U.S. Constitution or the Missouri Constitu-
tion.”57  These types of violations are more diverse than procedural constitu-
tional violations and can arise from a number of situations, such as laws that 
violate guarantees from the Bill of Rights to “statutes limiting wrongful death 
recoveries or mandating a certain type of civil service system[.]”58 
B.  The Single-Subject Rule 
Section 23 of Article III of the Missouri Constitution states that “[n]o 
bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its 
 
 48. See generally Dragich, supra note 6 (explaining procedural constitutional 
violations in law creation using Missouri case law). 
 49. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 351. 
 50. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 23. 
 51. See MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (2012).  Severability has been part of Missouri 
constitutional law for at least 100 years.  See Simpson v. Witte Iron Works Co., 155 
S.W. 810, 815 (Mo. 1913) (en banc). 
 52. Dragich, supra note 6, at 103. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 104. 
 56. See id. at 109, 154. 
 57. Legends Bank v. State, 361 S.W.3d 383, 391 n.5 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) 
(Fischer, J., concurring). 
 58. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: 
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797, 799 
(1987). 
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title.”59  The purpose of this limitation is to “facilitate orderly procedure, 
avoid surprise, . . . prevent ‘logrolling[,]’ [and] serve to keep individual 
members of the legislature and the public fairly apprised of the subject matter 
of pending laws.”60  It also provides the Governor an analogous power to the 
appropriations line-item veto power created in Article IV, Section 26 that can 
be applied to general legislation.61 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has created a doctrinal framework to 
guide the application of Section 23 to contested legislation.  Importantly, the 
single-subject rule is mandatory and not merely directory.62  Missouri prece-
dent explains that the mandatory application of the single-subject rule re-
quires that “where a law is clearly and palpably in opposition to it, there is no 
other alternative but to pronounce it invalid.”63  The test for whether a bill 
violates the single-subject rule is “whether the bill’s provisions fairly relate 
to, have a natural connection with, or are a means to accomplish the subject 
of the bill as expressed in the title.”64  The subject of the bill “includes all 
matters that fall within or reasonably relate to the general core purpose of the 
proposed legislation” and must be clearly stated in the title of the bill.65  The 
relationships between the individual provisions of the bill are not the focus of 
the test; rather, the test is applied to the title of the bill to determine its sub-
ject.66 
The seminal case interpreting Section 23 is Hammerschmidt v. Boone 
County.67  In Hammerschmidt, the Supreme Court of Missouri considered a 
bill that featured the word ‘elections’ in its title and dealt with elections in its 
first section, yet also contained provisions in its second section that allowed 
certain counties to “adopt an alternative form of government and frame a 
county constitution.”68  It ultimately found that the second section of the bill 
 
 59. MO. CONST. art. III, § 23. 
 60. Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Mo. 1997) (en banc).  
“Logrolling” describes the situation in which a number of bills that would otherwise 
not receive a majority vote are grouped into a single bill to ensure passage.  Id. at 325. 
 61. See MO. CONST. art. IV, § 26; see also Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cnty., 877 
S.W.2d 98, 102 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (discussing the “line-item” collateral effect of 
Section 23). 
 62. Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102; see also State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, 
498 (1870) (explaining that other states had held analogous provisions as “merely 
directory,” meaning that “if it was disregarded by the Legislature, its violation would 
not render the law void”). 
 63. Miller, 45 Mo. at 498. 
 64. Mo. Health Care Ass’n v. Att’y Gen. of Mo., 953 S.W.2d 617, 622 (Mo. 
1997) (en banc). 
 65. Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102. 
 66. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc) (citing C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 328 (Mo. 2000) (en 
banc)). 
 67. Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102-03. 
 68. Alexander R. Knoll, Tipping Point: Missouri Single Subject Provision, 72 
MO. L. REV. 1387, 1405 (2007) (quoting Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 99-100). 
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did not relate to elections, did not have a “natural connection” to that subject, 
was not a necessary subordinate part to the bill, and did not further the pur-
poses of a bill as they related to elections.69  As a result of the lack of connec-
tion between the title and the second section of the bill, the court found that 
House Bills 551 and 552 both violated the single-subject rule.70  The court in 
Hammerschmidt then turned to the question of whether or not it could sever 
the unconstitutional portions of the bill.71 
C.  Statutory and Doctrinal Severance 
Severance refers to the ability of courts to strike out a portion of a stat-
ute if that portion is held to be unconstitutional.72  In Missouri, the courts are 
granted this power by statute73 and by judicially-created doctrine.74 
The Missouri General Assembly has delegated authority to the courts to 
sever unconstitutional parts of laws.75  Statutory severance is codified under 
Section 1.140 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.76  Under the terms of Section 
1.140, severance is appropriate unless one of two exceptions is met.77  First, 
severance is inappropriate when the unconstitutional and constitutional provi-
sions are “so essentially and inseparably connected” that a court cannot pre-
sume that the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the 
unconstitutional one.78  Second, severance is inappropriate when the valid 
provisions cannot be executed in accordance with legislative intent as a result 
of incompleteness after severance.79  However, Missouri courts have inter-
 
 69. Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102-03. 
 70. Id. at 103. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 103. 
 73. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (Supp. 2011). 
 74. See Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 103.  For the remainder of this note, 
severance by the statute will be referred to as “statutory severance” and severance by 
judicial doctrine will be referred to as “doctrinal severance”; when referring to the 
remedy in general, it will be called “severance.” 
 75. See id. 
 76. That section states: 
The provisions of every statute are severable.  If any provision of a statute is 
found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remain-
ing provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provi-
sions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so 
dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature 
would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the 
court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are 
incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (Supp. 2011). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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preted this statute to be inapplicable to laws with provisions found unconsti-
tutional due to procedural violations.80 
In addition to the statutory delegation of authority to sever portions of 
substantively unconstitutional laws, the courts have also created a separate 
doctrine of severability.81  This doctrine applies to procedurally unconstitu-
tional laws and supplements the statutory delegation of authority in Section 
1.140,82 as the ability to sever portions of laws based on the substance of its 
provisions does “not adequately address the problems inherent in procedural-
ly unconstitutional statutes.”83  For procedural constitutional violations, “the 
entire bill is unconstitutional unless [the court] is convinced beyond reasona-
ble doubt that one of the bill’s multiple subjects is its original, controlling 
purpose and that the other subject is not.”84  To determine whether or not the 
provisions that are part of the added subject pass this test, the court considers 
“whether the additional subject is essential to the efficacy of the bill, whether 
it is a provision without which the bill would be incomplete and unworkable, 
and whether the provision is one without which the legislators would not 
have adopted the bill.”85 
D.  Severance as Applied to Violations of the Single-Subject Rule 
Historically, the Supreme Court of Missouri has applied severance as a 
remedy in several cases involving the single-subject rule, starting with Ham-
merschmidt.86  In that case, severance was discussed as a potential remedy for 
the constitutional infirmities of House Bills 551 and 552.87  Specifically, the 
court indicated that severance is a “more difficult issue” when procedural 
mandates of the constitution are violated.88  Despite the stated difficulty of 
such an analysis, the court in Hammerschmidt had “no difficulty in divining 
the primary subject” of the bills in question and found that the “title indicates 
 
 80. “[Section] 1.140 is intended to address . . . the circumstance when a statute 
has been enacted in a procedurally constitutional manner, but later some of the provi-
sions of the statute are found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be substantively 
invalid based on the U.S. Constitution or the Missouri Constitution.”  Legends Bank 
v. State, 361 S.W.3d 383, 391 n.5 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (Fischer, J., concurring) (em-
phasis added). 
 81. See generally Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 353-
54 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 82. See § 1.140. 
 83. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 354 n.4. 
 84. Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cnty., 877 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo. 1994) (en banc). 
 85. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Dragich, supra note 6, at 106 n.27 (noting that the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri did not invalidate any statute due to Section 23 for the ten years prior to Ham-
merschmidt (1984-1994)). 
 87. Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 103. 
 88. Id. 
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the bill relates to elections.”89  The court stated that a comparison of the 
“bill’s passage through the House prior to the addition of amendments [with 
the] contents as finally passed and presented to the governor shows that the 
bill is about election procedures.”90 
The severance standard applied by the court was originally used in a 
case on procedural requirements in initiative petitions.91  The court applied 
that standard to bills, and, after analyzing the subsections of the second sec-
tion, held that severance was possible for House Bills 551 and 552 because it 
was “convinced beyond reasonable doubt” that the second section was not 
essential to the efficacy of the bill, that the remainder of the bills were com-
plete and workable without the second section, and that “the legislature 
would have adopted the bills without [the second section].”92  In Ham-
merschmidt, the second section violated Section 23 and was severed from the 
remainder of the bill.93 
In cases since Hammerschmidt, the Supreme Court of Missouri has ap-
plied doctrinal severance in Section 23 cases and has severed the unconstitu-
tional portions in every case.94  The court has recently applied doctrinal sev-
erance in Legends Bank v. State.95  In Legends, the court considered Senate 
Bill 844 (“S.B. 844”).96  S.B. 844 was enacted as “An Act . . . relating to eth-
ics, with penalty provisions.”97  However, the bill was amended – and the title 
changed – several times prior to its passage.98  The final bill included provi-
sions stating “that the office of administration could not prohibit the purchase 
of supplies from an authorized General Services Administration vendor” and 
“that each member of the senate and house of representatives be provided 
with keys to the capitol dome.”99  Legends Bank and Joseph Klebba filed a 
declaratory judgment action, asserting inter alia that S.B. 844 violated the 
 
 89. Id. at 104. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 103 (citing Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799 
S.W.2d 824, 832 (Mo. 1990) (en banc)) (discussing and applying the standard appli-
cable to severability of provisions of a constitutional amendment). 
 92. Id. at 104. 
 93. Id.  The court also determined that none of the second section could be sev-
ered and combined with the remainder of the bill.  Id. 
 94. See St. Louis Cnty. v. Prestige Travel, Inc., 344 S.W.3d 708, 716-17 (Mo. 
2011) (en banc) (severed); Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) 
(severed); SSM Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hosp. v. State, 68 S.W.3d 412, 418 
(Mo. 2002) (en banc) (severed); Carmack v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Agric., 945 S.W.2d 
956, 961 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (severed unconstitutional portions). 
 95. Legends Bank v. State, 361 S.W.3d 383, 387 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (affirm-
ing the trial court’s severance, which was based on Section 23, on different procedur-
al grounds with the same severance analysis). 
 96. Id. at 385. 
 97. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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single-subject rule and the original purpose clause contained in Article III, 
Section 21, of the Missouri Constitution.100  The circuit court determined that 
the bill violated the single-subject rule and declared it unconstitutional.101 
On appeal, the majority of the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the 
circuit court’s decision based upon a violation of the original purpose clause, 
rather than the single-subject rule.102  After declaring it unconstitutional, the 
court then decided whether the constitutional portions of the bill could be 
severed, holding that severance in this case was appropriate.103  The court was 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the portions of the bill relating to 
“campaign finance, ethics and keys to the capitol dome” were not essential to 
the bill and the portions relating to procurement were “complete and are ca-
pable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.”104 
Judge Fischer, however, filed a concurrence in the case, stating that he 
believed that the judicially created doctrine of severance should be abol-
ished.105  Specifically, he argued two grounds that supported his contention: 
first, that doctrinal severance provides “no incentive [for legislators] to follow 
the clear and express procedural mandates of the Missouri Constitution[,]”106 
and second, that it potentially violates state separation of powers.107  Elabo-
rating on the effect of judicial severance on the separation of powers, Judge 
Fischer stated that it may subvert the legislative process by allowing legisla-
tion that might not have received enough votes to become law to survive.108  
Procedural constitutional violations, severance, and the discussion prompted 
by them came into sharp focus in Missouri Roundtable.109 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
In Missouri Roundtable, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that S.B. 7 
was unconstitutional in its entirety110 because (1) the inclusion of a contin-
gency clause referencing another bill violated the single-subject rule and (2) 
this violation was not severable from its remaining substantive provisions.111  
 
 100. Id.  The respondents also argued that S.B. 844 violated their First Amend-
ment right to free speech as a result of the decision in Citizens United v. Federal Elec-
tion Commission.  Id. at 388-89 (Fischer, J., concurring) (citing Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). 
 101. Id. at 386. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 386-87. 
 104. Id. at 387. 
 105. Id. (Fischer, J., concurring). 
 106. Id. at 392. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 392-93. 
 109. See generally Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348 (Mo. 
2013) (en banc). 
 110. Judge Paul C. Wilson did not participate in the decision.  Id. at 355. 
 111. Id. at 354-55. 
11
Whitfield: Two Tests of Severance
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
836 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
Though he concurred in the result, Judge Zel Fischer wrote separately to ex-
press his position that the “judicially created doctrine of severance should be 
abolished.”112  On appeal, the court reviewed the circuit court’s ruling de 
novo.113 
A.  The Court’s Opinion 
First,114 the court determined whether S.B. 7 violated the single-subject 
rule.115  The court began by explaining that the effective date of a law can be 
conditioned on the occurrence of an event without offending the Missouri 
Constitution in certain circumstances.116  However, it was a matter of first 
impression as to whether a law could be conditioned on the passage of future 
legislation that concerned a different subject matter.117 
The court then stated the beneficial aspects of the single-subject rule, 
noting that it facilitated orderly procedure, avoided surprise, prevented log-
rolling, raised awareness of legislation for the public and members of the 
legislature, and helped preserve the separation of powers.118  Elaborating on 
the single-subject rule’s role in the separation of powers, the court provided 
that the rule prevented the governor from being forced by the legislature into 
a “take-it-or-leave-it” decision where a bill “addresses one subject in an odi-
ous manner and another subject in a way the governor finds meritorious.”119 
Proceeding in its analysis, the court then set out the premises necessary 
for determining if Section 23 was violated by S.B. 7 and S.B. 8.120  First, the 
court stated the title of S.B. 7, specifically regarding the portion stating that 
the bill was “relat[ed] to science and innovation, with a contingent effective 
date.”121  Section A of S.B. 7 contained the operational provisions of 
MOSIRA, while Section B conditioned the effectiveness of S.B. 7 on the 
passage of S.B. 8.122  S.B. 8 contained eighty-two sections, all of which per-
tained to tax credits.123  By its title, S.B. 8 “relat[ed] to taxation, with penalty 
 
 112. Id. at 355 (Fischer, J., concurring). 
 113. Id. at 351 (majority opinion). 
 114. Before the court proceeded with its analysis, it noted that Governor Nixon 
could have vetoed the bill but chose not to due to his “uncertainty as to whether the 
bill could become effective.”  Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 351 (citing Akin v. Dir. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Mo. 1996) 
(en banc) (discussing a bill that conditioned its effectiveness on a popular vote)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 351-52 (citing Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cnty., 877 S.W.2d 98, 102 
(Mo. 1994) (en banc)). 
 119. Id. at 352 (quoting Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d at 102). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also S.B. 7, supra note 9. 
 122. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 352 (Mo. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 123. Id. at 350. 
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provisions and an emergency clause.”124  Based on the title of S.B. 7, the 
court determined that “the single subject core of this bill was to amend laws 
relating to science and innovation.”125  Because S.B. 7 was conditioned 
through Section B on the passage of S.B. 8,126 the court concluded that S.B. 7 
“clearly contained at least two subjects [because] the two bills cannot reason-
ably be read separately” as a result of the “tax reform measures . . . not fairly 
relat[ing] to science and innovation [and not having] any natural connection 
to that subject.”127 
However, the court distinguished the case from Akin v. Director of Rev-
enue,128 which constitutionally conditioned a bill on a popular vote.129  Rather 
than the specific tax increase contemplated in Akin, the tax provisions in Mis-
souri Roundtable were general provisions.130  Additionally, the public and 
legislature were not notified of the comprehensive tax credit reform upon 
which S.B. 7 was conditioned.131  Finally, the court stressed that if the effec-
tiveness of a bill could be conditioned on the passage of another piece of leg-
islation that has a different subject, then the procedural limitations of the con-
stitution would be circumvented.132 
Once the court determined that S.B. 7 was procedurally unconstitution-
al, it considered whether severance was possible.133  As an initial matter, the 
court strictly delineated the difference between the analyses employed for 
procedurally and substantively unconstitutional statutes.134  For substantively 
unconstitutional statutes, Section 1.140 controls.135  For procedurally uncon-
stitutional statutes, however, severance will only be employed when the court 
is “‘convinced beyond a reasonable doubt’ that the legislature would have 
passed the bill without the additional provisions and that the provisions in 
question are not essential to the efficacy of the bill.”136  The court held that 
when a contingency clause conditions the passage of one bill upon the pas-
sage of another and is included in the title of the initial bill, the initial bill 
violates the single-subject rule and the contingency clause cannot be severed 
 
 124. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 125. Id. at 352. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See generally Akin v. Dir. of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295 (Mo. 1996) (en 
banc). 
 129. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 352 (citing Akin, 934 S.W.2d at 
302). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 353. 
 134. Id. at 353-54. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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from the initial bill due to the inclusion of the contingency clause in its ti-
tle.137 
B.  The Concurrence 
Judge Fischer stated that although he concurred in the result of the case, 
he was writing separately to express his view, consistent with his positions in 
prior cases, that the doctrine of severance as applied to procedurally unconsti-
tutional bills should be abolished.138  He noted that his reasoning was identi-
cal to his concurrence in Legends: first, that judicial severance encourages the 
Missouri General Assembly to disregard its oath to protect the Missouri Con-
stitution and the procedural mandates expressed within it, and second, that 
judicial severance violates the separation of powers.139  He observed that 
Missouri Roundtable demonstrated the problems caused by the separation of 
powers when judicial severance is used.140  Specifically, Governor Nixon 
“signed a bill into law that he knew the General Assembly had made contin-
gent on the passage of another bill related to a different subject that the Gov-
ernor knew did not pass.”141  Ultimately, the case strengthened Judge Fisch-
er’s view that doctrinal severance should be discontinued and that he would 
affirm the circuit court “without even considering whether any part of a bill 
enacted in violation of the Missouri Constitution should become law.”142 
V. COMMENT 
The main result of the ruling in Missouri Roundtable is the clarification 
of the different analyses employed by the court for procedural and substantive 
constitutional violations.  The court noted that the differences between the 
two types of violations had not been fully explained prior to its decision.143  
Proceeding from the court’s clarification, this Part considers an alternative 
doctrine of severance that considers the concerns with procedurally unconsti-
tutional provisions and the separation of powers. 
Missouri Roundtable demonstrates the tension between the two ap-
proaches to severance: first, that under certain circumstances severance is 
allowable by statute or by doctrine, and second, that severance is allowable 
by statute but not allowable under doctrine.144  The first stance is that taken 
 
 137. Id. (citing Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cnty., 877 S.W.2d 98, 103-04 (Mo. 
1994) (en banc)). 
 138. Id. at 355 (Fischer, J., concurring). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 355-56. 
 141. Id. at 356. 
 142. Id.; see also id. at 351 (majority opinion) (noting that the Governor “ex-
press[ed] uncertainty as to whether the bill could become effective”). 
 143. Id. at 356 (Fischer, J., concurring). 
 144. Id. at 353 (majority opinion). 
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by the Hammerschmidt and the Missouri Roundtable majority, while the sec-
ond is that taken by Judge Fischer.  However, these competing policy stances 
are irreconcilable considering the efforts of the Missouri Roundtable majority 
to remain true to prior precedent and to give effect to the intent of the legisla-
ture, as is required for substantive constitutional violations,145 and Judge 
Fischer’s efforts to remain true to the text of the U.S. and Missouri Constitu-
tions.  Law Professor Martha Dragich summarizes these two different stances 
as “deference to the legislature’s policy choices [and] enforcement of . . . 
constitutional restrictions.”146 
An answer to this tension is to find a compromise position that respects 
the branches of state government and their different functions while remain-
ing true to the requirements of the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions.  The 
compromise position forwarded in this Part is to enforce and apply statutory 
severance strictly to substantive constitutional violations and never as a rem-
edy for procedural violations, unless other parties rely on the passage and 
implementation of a law in good faith and invalidation of the law would have 
collateral effects that outweigh the need to correct inconsistent legislative 
practice. 
A.  Constitutional and Statutory Considerations 
As previously stated, Missouri law grants courts the power to sever un-
constitutional portions of laws from constitutional portions of laws.147  Yet 
the nature and extent of these powers in single-subject challenges are not 
immediately clear in the Supreme Court of Missouri’s precedent, from Ham-
merschmidt to Missouri Roundtable.148  The basis and validity of a court’s 
power to sever can be ascertained by returning to the powers granted to both 
the legislature and the judiciary under the Missouri Constitution.149 
1.  Statute Permits Severance for Substantive Violations 
Section 1.140 provides that the “provisions of every statute are severa-
ble.”150  This statute represents a delegation of authority to “court[s] of com-
petent jurisdiction” to sever provisions of statutes.151  This section does not 
facially restrict its application to substantive constitutional violations.152  
However, the statute does provide that if any provision of a statute is found to 
 
 145. Id. at 353 n.4. 
 146. Dragich, supra note 6, at 110. 
 147. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (2012). 
 148. Missouri Roundtable, 396 S.W.3d 348; Hammerschmidt, 877 S.W.2d 98. 
 149. See MO. CONST. art. III, V. 
 150. Dragich, supra note 6, at 110. 
 151. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (2012). 
 152. See id. 
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be unconstitutional, then the remaining provisions are valid.153  This grant of 
power is only available for substantive constitutional violations, as single-
subject violations, like logrolling, taint the entire act.154  If the entire act is 
tainted, a court cannot intelligibly sever a portion of it to stand on its own. 
Another implication of the statute that supports its application to sub-
stantive constitutional violations is found by determining legislative intent.  
One of the grounds for not applying severance under the statute is when the 
valid portions of the statute “are incapable of being executed in accordance 
with the legislative intent.”155  Legislative intent is impossible to ascertain for 
single-subject violations, as legislative intent involves determining the will of 
a majority.156  This is particularly troublesome in the context of single-subject 
violations because the use of a majority to pass unrelated and otherwise in-
feasible legislation is what is being addressed.157  Thus, attempting to deter-
mine legislative intent in these cases ignores the fact that the “necessary as-
sumption that this will carry out the legislative purpose . . . cannot be 
made.”158 
Since one of the grounds for the inapplicability of Section 1.140 is non-
sensical when applied to procedural constitutional violations, and procedural 
violations taint the entire affected act, it makes more sense to restrict it to 
substantive constitutional violations.159  Legislative intent is regularly used in 
ascertaining the substantive constitutionality of a statute, and it is possible for 
such violations to be restricted to only a portion of a bill.160  As such, statuto-
ry severance under Section 1.140 is not applicable to procedural violations – 
in particular the single-subject rule – and is applicable only to substantive 
constitutional violations.161  This reasoning supports the conclusion in Mis-
souri Roundtable that substantive and procedural constitutional violations 
have separate analyses in the context of severance.162 
2.  The Constitution Prohibits Severance for Single-Subject Violations 
According to Article 3, Section 1 of the Missouri Constitution, the legis-
lative power is vested in a “senate and house of representatives to be styled 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. Dragich, supra note 6, at 155. 
 155. § 1.140. 
 156. See, e.g., Mount Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 314 F.3d 1146 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (discussing the use of legislative intent in statutory interpretation). 
 157. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 355. 
 158. Dragich, supra note 6, at 161.  Missouri’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard for procedural violations is particularly burdensome, as it is the highest 
standard available under the law, normally reserved for juries in criminal cases.  See, 
e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). 
 159. § 1.140; Dragich, supra note 6, at 103. 
 160. See Dragich, supra note 6, at 157. 
 161. Id. at 155. 
 162. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 353-54. 
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‘The General Assembly of the State of Missouri.’”163  In other words, only 
the legislature has the power to pass laws.164  Further, Section 23 states that 
“[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject.”165  The text of Section 23 
considers appropriations bills and a matter related to state debts and bond 
issues to be exempt from this requirement.166  Applying the canon of expres-
sio unius est exlusio alterius – the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
the other – it becomes clear that only appropriations bills and those matters 
related to state debts and bond issues are exempt from this rule.167 
Having established the applicability of Section 23 and the power of the 
legislature, the only conclusion is that these constitutional restrictions – the 
power to pass laws and the inability to pass laws that violate the single-
subject provision of Section 23 – when taken together, mean that the legisla-
ture is entirely without the substantive power to pass laws with more than one 
subject.168  As Professor Dragich correctly states, this renders the inquiry into 
legislative intent irrelevant169 – without the power to enact the laws in the 
first place, it does not matter what the law was meant to do or achieve.  Thus, 
severance is inapplicable to all procedural constitutional violations: if the law 
violates the procedural mandates of the constitution, then the law is without 
effect regardless of its separate parts. 
In sum, since Section 1.140 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri applies 
only to substantive constitutional violations,170 and the state constitution pro-
hibits severance for procedural constitutional violations, Missouri Roundtable 
gives effect to legislative intent through severance when the command of the 
Missouri Constitution is to strike the entire law.171 
B.  Reliance Interests 
Though the Missouri Constitution contemplates no exception to the sin-
gle-subject rule,172 there are other concerns at work that may justify severance 
apart from legislative intent, as was considered in Missouri Roundtable.173  
Specifically, a court may, when the law is insufficient to provide relief for 
parties before them, use its equitable powers to grant declaratory or injunctive 
relief; in fact, this is what a court does when it severs bills using doctrinal 
 
 163. MO. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 164. See id. 
 165. Id. at § 23. 
 166. Id.; see also id. at § 37(3). 
 167. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004). 
 168. MO. CONST. art. III, § 23. 
 169. Dragich, supra note 6, at 158. 
 170. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.140 (2012). 
 171. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc. v. State, 396 S.W.3d 348, 351, 353 (Mo. 2013) 
(en banc). 
 172. See supra Part II, Section B. 
 173. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 354-55. 
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severance.174  There is one potential way for a court to use its equitable power 
to sever bills without potentially contradicting the constitution: by applying 
severance to give fair and reasonable relief to those harmed by the potential 
collateral effects of procedurally unconstitutional statutes. 
As an example, MOSIRA was not severed in Missouri Roundtable.175  
MOSIRA was created to address economic development in science and tech-
nology in Missouri.176  Within the bill, key areas of Missouri’s economic 
development were targeted, including science and technology entrepreneur-
ship, using a percentage of state revenue from science and technology 
growth.177  Though MOSIRA was struck down very early in its implementa-
tion,178 a suit against a law arguing that it is procedurally unconstitutional can 
be brought so long as the relevant statute of limitations is met.179  Greater 
implementation of the law absent such a challenge would have produced reli-
ance interests on otherwise blameless third parties.180  Once these interests 
accrued, striking down such a law in its entirety could harm individuals to 
such an extent that the court, in its equitable powers, may sever portions of 
the law to preserve the rights that were, according to every indication and 
belief of the aggrieved, legally valid.181 
Applying this argument to a hypothetical shows the reliance interests 
created in this situation.  Assume arguendo that the challenge to MOSIRA 
was brought after the first of the year, after which a contract or grant may 
have been awarded to a third party contractor.  The contract or grant starts to 
pay the contractor, who then starts purchasing materials acting in reliance on 
the facial validity of the then-unchallenged act.  If a court were to strike the 
whole law, as in Missouri Roundtable,182 the contractor in this case would be 
stuck with the costs incurred to fulfill the obligations under the now-
unconstitutional law.  Thus, severance would be an adequate remedy to allow 
the provisions that would permit such reliance interests to remain intact. 
A maxim of equity, equity follows the law, holds that, “[c]ourts of equity 
can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provi-
 
 174. Hammons v. Ehney, 924 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (emphasis 
added) (“Normally when distinguishing between legal and equitable actions one looks 
to the remedy requested.  A money judgment is a legal remedy whereas some other 
type of court order is equitable.”).   
 175. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 353, 55. 
 176. Id. at 352. 
 177. S.B. 7, supra note 9. 
 178. See generally Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 351. 
 179. MO. REV. STAT. § 516.500 (2012). 
 180. The extent of the interest and the level of reliance on the law depend on the 
case.  For this hypothetical, it is assumed that the interest would be significant enough 
to merit a court’s attention, as a de minimis reliance interest would not justify sever-
ance regardless of the test used. 
 181. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (using the reliance interest to 
justify the refusal to apply antitrust laws to baseball teams). 
 182. Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 350. 
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sions than can courts of law.”183  A more recent formulation is that a court in 
equity “may not disregard a statutory provision, for where the Legislature has 
enacted a statute which governs and determines rights of the parties under 
stated circumstances, equity courts . . . are bound thereby.”184  In the excep-
tional circumstance under consideration, it is the good faith reliance of third-
parties on what was the law that would act to preserve their rights, even 
though the law that was passed was determined to be procedurally constitu-
tionally deficient.  A court, as stated, cannot disregard the statutory provi-
sions that created rights that the court itself would then take away.  Rather, 
where severance would deprive otherwise blameless individuals of rights 
created under procedurally unconstitutional litigation, a court should strive to 
strike a balance between the mandates of the constitution and the rights of the 
people – the same people for whom the constitution was adopted.185 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Procedural and substantive constitutional violations will continue to oc-
cur, despite the best efforts of the General Assembly.  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri must be prepared to deal with these violations in a way that remains 
true to the mandates of the Missouri and U.S. Constitutions, yet allows for the 
realities of government and the consequences of statutes of general applica-
tion.  Presently, severance analysis in Missouri uses the dichotomy of sub-
stantive and procedural violations to frame the inquiry.186  Going forward, 
this distinction will be tested in unique factual situations that will challenge 
the utility of these concepts.  As stated by Judge Fischer, procedural constitu-
tional mandates exist to promote “necessary and valuable legislative account-
ability and transparency.”187 
Instead of using its current analysis, the court should return to the con-
stitutional and statutory mandates and equitable principles of the law to pro-
duce an outcome that spans the gap that separates rigid reliance on the text of 
positive law and the process of justice.  Only by honoring these traditions can 
the judiciary and law inspire respect in proportion to our knowledge of how 
law is made. 
 
 
 183. Straube v. Bowling Green Gas Co., 227 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Mo. 1950) (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 184. Kuenzle v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 865 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. 1993) (en 
banc). 
 185. “That all political power is vested in and derived from the people; that all 
government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is 
instituted solely for the good of the whole.”  MO. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 186. See, e.g., Mo. Roundtable for Life, Inc., 396 S.W.3d at 353-54. 
 187. Legends Bank v. State, 361 S.W.3d 383, 389 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
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